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THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: THE WRONG QUESTION
ROBERT J. SAMUELSON*
Professor Galanter has reminded us that statistics can be dis-
torted to create a misleading impression of reality. And we would
all be better off if the term "crisis" were not applied to every prob-
lem that happens along. But his main message-that everything is,
more or less, okay with the civil justice system-is less convincing.
To get meaningful answers to important social questions, you must
first ask the right questions. The right question is not: is there a
litigation "explosion?" (There could easily be a perfectly justifiable
"explosion.") The right question is: does the civil justice system do
its job as well as can be reasonably expected? I am no legal scholar,
but my hunch is that the answer is "no."
Admittedly, the right question is a tougher question. You first
have to decide what is the purpose of civil justice and, then, whether
the existing system is meeting "reasonable" standards of perform-
ance. On the broadest level, of course, our legal system exists to
help society set and enforce rules of fair and just conduct, whatever
those terms may mean. But, more specifically, the civil justice sys-
tem-the laws, the courts and all the "servants" of the courts-is
supposed to help resolve conflicts that cannot otherwise be resolved
and to do so without imposing undue adverse social side-effects.
The system's purpose is not to intensify conflict, prolong it, or re-
solve it at huge costs to either the parties or society as a whole. My
suspicion is that the existing system is guilty of precisely these evils
and that, further, these defects often reflect the economic self-inter-
est of practicing attorneys.
The more conflict that can be converted into legal action, the
more lawyers prosper. Attorneys who bill by the hour have an obvi-
ous interest in billing more hours. Contingency-fee plaintiffs' attor-
neys have a clear interest in identifying and suing wealthy
defendants. Attorneys who respond to these strong incentives are
not venal, but their collective behavior may pervert the civil justice
system. Consider an analogy-doctors. The way doctors (and hos-
pitals) are paid affects how medicine is practiced. Before World
* The author is an economics columnist. His columns appear in NEWSWEEK, The
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Boston Globe, among others. He is a jour-
nalist, not an economist.
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War II, patients directly paid about four-fifths of their medical costs.
Now, private insurers and government programs (such as medicare)
pay about 70%. For doctors and hospitals, this payment system
means that the more services and procedures they perform, the
more they're paid. Naturally, the line between what is appropriate
medicine and what is rewarding has blurred. There are more tests,
more hospitalization, and more surgery-more, in fact, than may be
necessary. It's not that doctors or hospital officials are venal.
They're human and respond to economic signals.
As a journalist, I detect no huge curiosity on the part of lawyers
or legal scholars-including Galanter in his essay-about how to-
day's incentives affect the civil justice system. Galanter's essay is in-
tended to debunk the idea of a "litigation explosion." The idea
seems to be that, if the litigation explosion can be shown to be a
myth, then all the associated complaints about the civil justice sys-
tem must be similarly exaggerated. But this easy logic leaves two
basic questions hanging in mid-air. Why does America require a
proportionately greater and greater number of lawyers? And is the
increase good for us? Galanter himself points out elsewhere that
the per capita level of attorneys in the United States is more than
twice as high as the nearest industrial country (New Zealand) and
more than four times the average of thirteen industrial nations.'
More important, the number of lawyers has been rising much faster
than the general population during the post war period. In 1951,
there was one lawyer for every 695 Americans; by 1980, that was
one for every 418 Americans. By one estimate, the ratio in 1995
may be one lawyer per 279 Americans. 2
Clearly, there is a host of causes for our society's rising need of
lawyers. Government regulation, taxation, and international com-
1. This table shows the number of lawyers per one million population. The figures
are generally from the 1970s.
United States 2348.7
New Zealand 1081.3
Australia 911.6
England/Wales 606.4
West Germany 417.2
Japan 91.2
Average of 13 Industrial Nations
(excluding United States) 545.6
Source: adapted from Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don 't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 53 (1983).
2. B. CURRAN, K. RoSIcH, C. CARSON, M. PUCCErri, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL RE-
PORT, A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 4 (1985).
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merce have all grown in complexity in the postwar era. Divorce has
become more common, and crime rates have risen. More than ever,
lawyers are involved in business and personal planning. Despite
these influences, my guess is that civil litigation (and its threat) has
played an important role in expanding the size of the legal profes-
sion. Like most of us, lawyers specialize. They have an economic
interest in having their specialties become more important. If you
are a tax lawyer, you benefit-financially, if not psychologically-
from a complicated tax code. If you are a plaintiffs' products liabil-
ity or personal-injury attorney, you benefit from broad doctrines of
liability. We should not be surprised that lawyers have urged-and
courts have accepted-increasingly expansive theories of liability.
Many lawyers seek to extend the authority of the law in the same
way that companies seek to create new products or expand the de-
mand for existing products. It's their business. Nor should we be
surprised that the number of plaintiffs' lawyers has apparently risen
faster recently than the total number of lawyers. The membership
of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) has roughly
tripled to nearly 60,000 since 1970, a period when the total number
of lawyers rose 90%. (I say "apparently," because it's impossible
to know how rigidly ATLA's membership reflects the number of
plaintiffs' lawyers.)
What are all these people doing? Galanter brushes aside the
issue by showing that the rise in litigation levels has been modest.
But his own work wisely warns us to be suspicious of raw caseload
statistics. If lawyers are economic actors, then the volume of their
activity is less important than its value. Some lawyers may be spend-
ing more time on fewer cases with higher stakes. Or more claims
may be settled without court complaints ever being filed. Both de-
velopments seem plausible. According to one study, claims paid
and the defense costs of insurance companies and other corporate
defendants have risen sharply since the mid-1970s-from about
1.4% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1975 to 1.8% of GNP in
1984.' Likewise, a study by the Rand Corporation of civil cases in
Cook County found that "deep pocket" defendants-in particular,
corporations-usually paid larger awards than individual defendants
for similar injuries.5 When plaintiffs had very serious injuries, cor-
3. Telephone conversation with office of ATLA, Spring 1986.
4. R. Sturgis, The Cost of the U.S. Tort System: An address to the American Insur-
ance Association (Nov. 14, 1985) (available from Tillinghast, Nelson & Warren, Inc.).
5. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS 43 (1985).
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porate defendants were also more likely to be found liable than non-
business defendants. 6 The "deep pocket" theory of litigation is not
just a myth.
I am not impressed with the argument that, because most cases
are settled out of court, the system is working reasonably efficiently.
My hunch is that the system encourages the settlement of otherwise
weak cases. Consider a hypothetical example. X sues Corporation Y
for $100,000. Plaintiff and defense attorneys evaluate the case iden-
tically: if it goes to trial, the plaintiff has a one-in-four chance of
prevailing; the cost of defending the case is estimated at $15,000. In
these circumstances, the defense's least expensive course is to offer
to settle for $14,999. Given the chances of losing, a more generous
settlement (say, $25,000) may even make sense. The defense may
still decide to try the case, motivated by a sense of righteousness or
a concern for its reputation. But when future suits are inevitable-
for example, when the defendant is an insurance company-these
considerations will be weaker. In short, it's possible (and probable,
I think) that plaintiffs' attorneys can "game" the system.
So, too, can defense attorneys. Although I believe the existing
system is generally biased against the defendant, the reverse may be
true. In any case, the system can clearly discriminate against plain-
tiffs by making a case too costly or time-consuming to pursue. In
many instances, plaintiffs with legitimate grievances may simply be
overwhelmed by larger, wealthier defendants. Consider a case in
which Individual X sues Corporation Y for, say, $10 million. As-
sume also that, if the plaintiff wins, the defendant will be exposed to
other claims. Now assume that both plaintiff and defense attorneys
believe that, if the case goes to trial, the plaintiff has a four-to-one
chance of prevailing. The defense's best strategy may be to procras-
tinate-to run up the plaintiff's legal costs (or the lawyer's out-of-
pocket expenses), increasing the temptation for a much smaller set-
tlement in which the defendant admits no guilt. In neither of these
admittedly hypothetical cases has the civil justice system operated as
I would like. It has rewarded weak cases and punished strong cases.
It has not resolved conflicts clearly or quickly. It has been expedi-
ent, not efficient.
My belief is that these defects could be reduced by adopting
something like the "British rule": that is, the losing side would pay
the winning side's legal fees and costs; in a contingency-fee case,
plaintiffs' attorneys would pay the winner's expenses. The conven-
6. Id.
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tional objection to this system is that it would reduce access to the
legal system and, therefore, is undesirable. This might be the result
when plaintiffs themselves (as opposed to their lawyers) are at risk
for the other side's legal costs. But this outcome is not necessarily
undesirable. Courts cannot resolve all disputes, even of a legal na-
ture, and there needs to be a threshold of entry into the system.
Someone suing ought to feel sufficiently confident about the out-
come or sufficiently aggrieved to bear the full costs of being wrong.
The existing system is not morally superior. If you sue me and I
win, I still lose; I'm out my legal costs. If the litigation involves indi-
viduals or small businesses, why should the winner bear this "tax"?
Not only is it unfair, it is precisely this imbalance that creates pres-
sures for expedient settlements and, therefore, encourages weak
cases.
The real fear, of course, is that the British approach would fur-
ther insulate large businesses from suits by wronged individuals. In
my view, this anxiety is baseless. Under the existing system, few-if
any-individuals can sue large corporations with their own re-
sources. Can I sue G.M.? Are you kidding? G.M. would depose me
into insolvency and insanity. It is the contingency-fee attorney who
decides to take the case and, therefore, assumes most of the eco-
nomic risk. When attorneys bring cases, they should also bear the
full costs of losing. Those who fear that this change would reduce
litigation need to acknowledge the logic of their position. It must
mean that plaintiffs' attorneys are now accepting cases that they do
not truly wish to try because they do not think they can win. A win-
ning case under the British approach would be more lucrative than
under the present system, because the attorney's fees and costs
would be reimbursed-that is, added to the award. No one can
know with absolute certainty whether a case will be won or lost. But
if all the cases being brought today are strong, then they will remain
strong and would also be brought under a new system. In some
cases, contingency-fee attorneys would pay the other side's fees and
costs; but in other cases, their contingency fee awards would be sup-
plemented by the reimbursement of fees and costs. The rewards
and costs of individual cases would be greater, but as a group plain-
tiffs' attorneys would fare as well as they do today.
In our court system, lawyers constitute the most important first
line of screening: they determine which conflicts get admitted into
the system (because a plaintiff needs a lawyer) and, once admitted,
how cases are conducted (because attorneys shape legal strategies).
In my view, a changed fee system would force attorneys-both
[VOL. 46:78
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plaintiffs' and defendants'-to focus earlier on the merits of individ-
ual cases. How the process might affect defense attorneys is, I ad-
mit, speculative. These attorneys can now often recommend to
clients a legal strategy-delay, increase the other side's legal costs-
that also suits their economic self-interest. My suspicion is that,
faced with the possibility of paying the other side's legal costs, de-
fendants would pressure their attorneys to act differently. Confident
defendants would be more eager for a trial, because-assuming vic-
tory-their final costs would be less. Less assured defendants would
move more quickly for a settlement. Defendants and plaintiffs
would have an interest in expediting a resolution and limiting legal
costs. And that's the purpose of the civil justice system: to resolve
conflicts quickly and efficiently.
Anyone who thinks the system now operates adequately needs
only examine the current medical malpractice mess. It is a genuine
disgrace-not because lawyers or doctors are evil, but because the
system channels conflicts in antisocial ways. Ideally, we would like a
malpractice system that compensates victims and disciplines incom-
petent or irresponsible doctors, including barring them from prac-
ticing. Today's system is a parody of this ideal. It imposes large
costs (through higher insurance premiums) indiscriminately on all
doctors, diverts a substantial part of the award away from victims to
attorneys, and, finally, provides no formal mechanism for disciplin-
ing bad doctors. One possible virtue of changing today's system of
legal fees is that it might encourage attorneys to design alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms that limit their costs. For malprac-
tice, this might involve some type of review board that, aside from
compensating victims, would also discipline doctors.7
I agree with Galanter that there are many public benefits to liti-
gation-and, especially, its threat. I am also worried that the cur-
rent "crisis" atmosphere may result in undesirable legislation. The
insurance industry is clearly trying to exploit today's climate for its
7. A number of recent studies indicate that the flaws in malpractice suits may more
broadly apply to the tort system. The Rand Corporation estimated, for example, that in
1985 net compensation to victims amounted to about 45% of the total cost of the sys-
tem. Total costs included legal fees and expenses of defendants and plaintiffs, the value
of litigants' time, insurance company costs for processing claims, the courts' administra-
tive costs, and awards to plaintiffs. Costs and Outcomes of Tort Litigation: Testimony Presented
July 29, 1986, Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Productivity, & Economic Growth of the Joint Eco-
nomic Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (page 12 of separately paginated testimony)
(testimony ofJames S. Kakalik, The Institute for Civil Justice of The Rand Corporation).
Two other studies are: A. SCHOTrER & J. ORDOVER, THE COST OF THE TORT SYSTEM
(1986); R. Sturgis, supra note 4.
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own purposes. Some matters of liability may, in fact, warrant redefi-
nition. But I am suspicious of arbitrary limits-for example, on pain
and suffering awards to successful plaintiffs. These restrictions may
help certain insurers and almost no one else. They may deter riskier
suits, involving novel issues, because awards are artificially limited.
The idea that these restrictions reduce litigation may turn out to be
fanciful. Deterred from personal-injury suits, plaintiffs' attorneys
may simply "go into business litigation," as columnist Jane Bryant
Quinn (whose husband is an attorney) recently wrote.8 Securities
litigation, in which lawyers bring class actions against corporations
for alleged misrepresentation in their financial disclosure state-
ments, is already one booming area.
But it is simplistic to think that attorneys will flock towards dif-
ferent dispute-resolution procedures because this is socially desira-
ble. My belief is that they will only do so when they find it in their
economic interests. Nor am I suggesting that designing an alterna-
tive system of compensations is easy. There surely would be many
messy problems of detail. How would reasonable fees be deter-
mined? Are there some areas of civil litigation in which one might
not want to apply a new standard? Are there other changes one
might want to undertake simultaneously? (For example, an attorney
has suggested to me that judges, not juries, should determine dam-
age awards. The jury would decide liability. He justifies this divi-
sion of labor as analogous to criminal cases, in which juries
determine guilt and judges impose sentences.) But there is already
an explicit recognition in public policy that how fees are awarded
affects the type of cases that will be brought. Specifically, Congress
has allowed courts to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in
some types of cases-civil rights is the best-known example-so that
these cases, which are deemed in the public interest, will be
brought. It's simply common sense that the way our system rewards
attorneys profoundly shapes how the system operates.
The need is to acknowledge this reality and address its conse-
quences. Galanter notes that there has been a "general but uneven
spread of higher expectations ofjustice and the growth of a sense of
entitlement to recompense for many kinds of injury." 9 He then adds
that "this sense is not self-activating" and that its translation "into
claims depends on various contextual matters."' One of these
"contextual matters" is lawyers' own economic interests. The law
8. Quinn, Cutting Back Verdicts, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986, at 44.
9. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 28 (1986).
10. Id.
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today is a business. The sooner we recognize how lawyers' commer-
cial interests may undermine our system of civil justice, the better.
